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Continuous-time integral dynamics for aggregative game equilibrium seeking
Claudio De Persis, Sergio Grammatico
Abstract— In this paper, we consider continuous-time semi-
decentralized dynamics for the equilibrium computation in a
class of aggregative games. Specifically, we propose a scheme
where decentralized projected-gradient dynamics are driven by
an integral control law. To prove global exponential convergence
of the proposed dynamics to an aggregative equilibrium, we
adopt a quadratic Lyapunov function argument. We derive
a sufficient condition for global convergence that we position
within the recent literature on aggregative games, and in
particular we show that it improves on established results.
Index Terms— Noncooperative game theory, Multi-agent sys-
tems, Decentralized control, Projected dynamical systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Aggregative game theory [1] represents a mathematical
framework to model inter-dependent optimization problems
for a set of noncooperative agents, or players, whenever the
decision of each agent is affected by some aggregate effect
of all the agents. Remarkably, this feature emerges in several
application areas, such as demand side management in the
smart grid [2], e.g. for electric vehicles [3], [4], [5] and
thermostatically controlled loads [6], [7], demand response
in competitive markets [8] and network congestion control
[9], [10].
Existence and uniqueness of equilibria in (aggregative)
games has been widely studied in the literature [11], [12],
[13, §12], [14, Part II], also in automatic control and control
systems[15], [16], [17]. To compute a game equilibrium,
severable algorithms are available, both distributed [18], [19],
[20], [21], [22] and semi-decentralized [23], [24], [10], [25],
[26].
The majority of the available algorithms consider discrete-
time dynamics that, under appropriate technical assumptions
and sufficient conditions on the problem data, converge to an
equilibrium of the game, e.g. Nash equilibrium. An elegant
approach is in fact to characterize the desired equilibrium
solutions as the zeros of a monotone operator, e.g. the
concatenation of interdependent Karush–Kuhn–Tucker oper-
ators, and in turn formulate an equivalent fixed-point prob-
lem, which is solved via appropriate discrete-time nonlinear
dynamics with guaranteed global asymptotic convergence.
On the other hand, only a few contributions have ad-
dressed the equilibrium computation problem via continuous-
time dynamics, e.g. [21], [22]. One reason is that in the
C. De Persis is with the Faculty of Science and Engineering, University
of Groningen, The Netherlands. S. Grammatico is with the Delft Center for
Systems and Control (DCSC), TU Delft, The Netherlands. E-mail addresses:
c.de.persis@rug.nl, s.grammatico@tudelft.nl. This work
was partially supported by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific
Research (NWO) under research projects OMEGA (grant n. 613.001.702)
and P2P-TALES (grant n. 647.003.003).
continuous-time case where optimal decision problems of the
agents are subject to constraints, projected dynamics, hence
dynamics with discontinuous right-hand side, shall be con-
sidered. Specifically, in [21], the authors propose distributed
dynamics based on a consensus protocol to compute a Nash
equilibrium, under technical assumptions that include the
strong monotonicity of the so-called pseudo-gradient game
mapping, but in the absence of constraints. In [22], the
authors address the generalized Nash equilibrium problem,
that is, with both local and coupling constraints, via extended
continuous-time dynamics that include three auxiliary vector
variables for each agent. To prove convergence to an equilib-
rium, the authors postulate that the pseudo-gradient mapping
is strictly monotone and that the parameter gains are chosen
large enough, that is, directly proportional to the number of
agents in the game.
Differently from the available literature, and in particular
from [21], [22], the contribution of this paper is to provide
a first, simple, integral control algorithm for the computa-
tion of an aggregative equilibrium via semi-decentralized
dynamics. Since we consider games with constraints, we
propose equilibrium seeking dynamics that are described as
a projected dynamical system [27]. Therefore, the technical
difficulty we address is to study the solutions to the derived
projected dynamical system in the sense of Carathe`odory
solutions. With this aim, we exploit an invariance principle
for projected dynamical systems. The main technical con-
tribution is then to prove global exponential convergence of
the proposed continuous-time, semi-decentralized, dynamics
to an equilibrium of the considered aggregative game, under
a mild design choice that involves a few problem parameters
only. Interestingly, we discover that the derived sufficient
condition improves on that in [24, Th. 2], especially when
the number of agents playing the aggregative game is large.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the
mathematical setup and defines the aggregative equilibrium
as solution concept. In Section III, we propose integral
dynamics for the equilibrium computation and present the
main technical results. In Section IV, we compare the de-
rived sufficient condition for global convergence within the
recent literature of (monotone) aggregative games. Section
VI summarizes the message of the paper and points at future
research directions. The proofs are given in the Appendix to
improve the reading flow.
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Basic notation
R denotes the set of real numbers, while R := R∪{∞} the
set of extended real numbers. I denotes the identity matrix. 0
(1) denotes a matrix/vector with all elements equal to 0 (1);
to improve clarity, we may add the dimension of these matri-
ces/vectors as subscript. A⊗B denotes the Kronecker prod-
uct between matrices A and B. ‖A‖ denotes the maximum
singular value of matrix A. Given N vectors x1, . . . , xN ∈
Rn, we define x := col
(
x1, . . . , xN
)
=
[
x1
>
, . . . , xN
>]>,
and x−i := col
(
x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xN
)
. Given N sets
X 1, . . . ,XN , we define the Cartesian product by X :=
X 1 × . . .×XN .
Definitions
Let the set S ⊆ Rn be non-empty. The mapping ιS :
Rn → {0, ∞} denotes the indicator function, i.e., ιS(x) = 0
if x ∈ S, ∞ otherwise. The set-valued mapping NS : Rn ⇒
Rn denotes the normal cone operator, i.e., NS(x) = ∅ if
x /∈ S, {v ∈ Rn | supz∈S v>(z − x) ≤ 0} otherwise. The
mapping projS(·) := argminy∈S ‖y − ·‖ : Rn → S denotes
the projection operator; ΠS(x, v) := lim→0+
projS(x+v)−x

denotes the projection of the vector v ∈ Rn onto the tangent
cone of S at x ∈ S.
For a function f : Rn → R, dom(f) := {x ∈ Rn |
f(x) < ∞}; ∂f : dom(f) ⇒ Rn denotes its subdifferential
set-valued mapping, defined as ∂f(x) := {v ∈ Rn | f(z) ≥
f(x) + v>(z−x) for all z ∈ dom(f)}; if f is differentiable
at x, then ∂f(x) = {∇f(x)}.
Given a closed convex set C ⊆ Rn and a single-valued
mapping ϕ : C → Rn, the variational inequality problem
VI(C, ϕ), is the problem to find x∗ ∈ C such that (y −
x∗)> ϕ(x∗) ≥ 0 for all y ∈ C.
II. TECHNICAL BACKGROUND: AGGREGATIVE GAMES
AND VARIATIONAL AGGREGATIVE EQUILIBRIA
An aggregative game, Ga
(I, (J i)i∈I , (X i)i∈I), consists
of N agents (or players) indexed by the set I :=
{1, 2, . . . , N}, where each agent i can decide on a vector
xi ∈ X i ⊆ Rn, with the aim to minimize its cost function
x 7→ J i(xi, avg(x)), J i : Rn × Rn → R ∪ {∞}, where
avg(x) := 1N
∑
j∈I x
j .
Let us postulate the following standing assumption that is
valid throughout the paper.
Standing Assumption 1: Compactness and convexity,
from [24, Assumptions 1, 2]. For each i ∈ I, the set
X i ( Rn is nonempty, compact and convex; the cost
function J i is defined as
J i(xi, σ) = f i(xi) + (Cσ)
>
xi + ιX i
(
xi
)
, (1)
where the function f i : Rn → R is twice continuously
differentiable and `-strongly convex in X i, with constant
` > 0, and C ∈ Rn×n. 
Remark 1: In a discrete-time setting, the functions
{fi}i∈I can be assumed to be continuous, not necessarily
differentiable [24], [10]. Since the focus of this paper is
equilibrium seeking in continuous-time, to avoid technical
difficulties with non-smooth analysis and set-valued subdif-
ferential mappings, we assume that the functions are twice
continuously differentiable, as in [21], [22]. We envision,
however, that the differentiability assumption can be relaxed
via the arguments in [28]. 
In this paper, we focus on the design of continuous-time
dynamics that converge to an aggregative equilibrium, which
is a set of decision variables such that each is optimal given
the average among all the decision variables.
Definition 1: Aggregative equilibrium, from [10, Def. 1].
A collective vector col
(
x¯1, . . . , x¯N
)
= x¯ ∈ X is an ag-
gregative equilibrium for the game Ga
(I, (J i)i∈I , (X i)i∈I)
if, for all i ∈ I,
x¯i ∈ argmin
y∈X i
J i (y, avg(x¯)) .
The set of aggregative equilibria is denoted by X¯ . 
Remark 2: Alternatively, instead of the aggregative equi-
librium, the notion of Nash equilibrium can be considered
as target collective set, see [24, Sec. V]. Moreover, we refer
the interested reader to [10, Th. 1] and to [29], [30] for a
comparison between aggregative and Nash equilibria. 
It follows from [10, Prop. 1] that an aggregative equi-
librium does exist. In view of Standing Assumption 1,
we provide an equivalent characterization of aggregative
equilibrium via a variational inequality.
Lemma 1: Variational characterization, from [31, Prop.
1.4.2]. A collective vector x¯ = col
(
x¯1, . . . , x¯N
) ∈ X
is an aggregative equilibrium for the aggregative game
Ga
(I, (J i)i∈I , (X i)i∈I) if and only if it satisfies the varia-
tional inequality
inf
z∈X i
(
z − x¯i)>(∂f i(x¯i) + C avg(x¯)) ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ I. (2)

In view of the equilibrium characterization in Lemma 1,
uniqueness of the aggregative equilibrium can be studied via
variational inequality arguments, see [32, Th. 3].
III. CONTINUOUS-TIME INTEGRAL DYNAMICS FOR
AGGREGATIVE EQUILIBRIUM SEEKING
With the aim to asymptotically reach an aggregative equi-
librium, we propose the continuous-time dynamics
x˙i = ΠX i
(
xi , −∂fi(xi)− Cσ
)
, ∀i ∈ I,
σ˙ = k
(
−σ + 1N
∑
j∈I x
j
) (3)
which reads in projected vector form as[
x˙
σ˙
]
= ΠX×Rn
([
x
σ
]
,
[−∂f(x)− 1N ⊗ (Cσ)
k (−σ + avg(x))
])
(4)
where ∂f(x) = col
(
∂f1(x1), . . . , ∂fN (xN )
)
and k > 0 is
a free design parameter.
We note that the structure of the computation and infor-
mation exchange in (3) is semi-decentralized: the agents per-
form decentralized computations, namely, projected-gradient
steps, and do not exchange information among each other,
while a central control unit, which does not participate in the
game, collects the average of the agents’ decisions (aggregate
information), avg(x(t)), and broadcasts a signal, σ(t), to the
agents playing the aggregative game. In turn, the dynamics of
the broadcast signal are driven by the aggregate information,
avg(x(t)).
First, we observe that an equilibrium for the dynamics in
(3) generates an aggregative equilibrium.
Lemma 2: If the pair (x¯, σ¯) is an equilibrium for the
dynamics in (3), then x¯ is an aggregative equilibrium for
the game Ga
(
N, {J i}i, {X i}i
)
. Conversely, if x¯ is an ag-
gregative equilibrium for the game Ga
(I, (J i)i∈I , (X i)i∈I),
then the pair (x¯, σ¯) = (x¯, avg(x¯)) is an equilibrium for the
dynamics in (3). 
In the rest of the section, we analyze the convergence of
the projected dynamics in (4) to an equilibrium. In particular,
we take two preliminary steps. First, we introduce a quadratic
storage function, V (x), and analyze its Lyapunov derivative,
∇V (x) x˙. Then, we consider a quadratic Lyapunov function
candidate, W (x, σ), and establish a condition on the prob-
lem data `, C, N and on the design parameter k such that its
Lyapunov derivative is negative definite. Finally, we establish
our main asymptotic convergence result, whose proof - given
in the appendix - is based on Lyapunov stability theory for
projected dynamical systems with Carathe`odory solutions.
Lemma 3: Storage Lyapunov function. The function
x 7→ V (x) := 12‖x− projX¯ (x)‖2
is such that, for all x ∈ X and u ∈ RnN ,
∂V (x)>ΠX (x , −∂f(x) + u) ≤
− (x− projX¯ (x))> (∂f(x)− ∂f(projX¯ (x)) + u− u¯) ,
(5)
where u¯ := −1N ⊗ avg (projX¯ (x)). 
Proposition 1: Lyapunov decrease. Consider the Lya-
punov function candidate W : X × Rn → R defined as
W (x, σ) = 12‖x− projX¯ (x)‖2 + 12‖σ − avg(projX¯ (x))‖2.
If the inequality condition
min{`, k} > 12‖C‖∞ + 12 kN , (6)
holds, then we have that
W˙ (x, σ) := ∇W (x, σ) [ x˙σ˙ ] ≤ −W (x, σ) (7)
for all (x, σ) ∈ X × Rn, for some  > 0. 
Theorem 1: Global exponential convergence. Assume that
the condition in (6) holds. For any initial condition
(x0, σ0) ∈ X × Rn, there exists a unique Carathe`odory
solution to (4) starting from (x0, σ0), which remains in
X × Rn for all time, and exponentially converges to the
set X¯ × avg (X¯ ). 
IV. DISCUSSION ON THE CONVERGENCE CONDITION
For k = 1, the σ-dynamics in (4) can be thought as a
control law, implemented by a central agent, which is the
continuous-time counterpart of the Banach–Picard iteration
studied in [24], while for k ∈ (0, 1), the counterpart of the
Krasnoselskij iteration.
We note however that in the continuous-time dynamics in
(4), the parameter gain k must not necessarily be smaller
than 1. For instance, if k = α `, for some α > 0, then the
inequality condition in (6) reads as 2` > ‖C‖∞+ α`N , hence(
2− αN
)
` > ‖C‖∞, which is equivalent to ` > N2N−α‖C‖∞
whenever α < 2N . Let us compare the latter with the
inequality condition established in [24, Th. 2], i.e., ` ≥ ‖C‖.
Since ‖C‖∞ ≤ ‖C‖, the inequality condition in (6) is less
strict than that in [24, Th. 2] if N2N−α < 1, i.e., α < N , e.g.
for large number of agents N .
Next, we relate the condition in (6) with the monotonicity
of the mapping that defines the variational inequality in (2),
Lemma 1, which is
x 7→ F (x) := ∂f(x) + 1N ⊗ (Cavg(x)) . (8)
In view of [33, Cor. 1] and [23, Lemma 3], since the local
cost functions {f i}i∈I are `-strongly convex, we have that
the mapping F is strictly monotone if `+ 12λmin
(
C + C>
)
>
0, e.g. if C + C> < 0.
Finally, differently from the convergence condition pro-
vided in [22, Sec. 4], where the parameter gains must be
chosen directly proportional to the number of agents, N , the
inequality condition in (6) becomes less strict as N grows.
Clearly, the latter is an advantageous feature especially when
the number of agents is very large.
V. NUMERICAL SIMULATION: ILLUSTRATIVE
GAME-THEORETIC DEMAND SIDE MANAGEMENT
A recurrent application area for aggregative games is the
demand side management, where the agents of the game
are electricity prosumers, that is, consumers and possibly
producers, whose disutility function depends on the average
electricity demand, e.g. via a common electricity price.
For instance, in [22, Sec. 5.2], the individual cost function
of each agent i is chosen as
J i
(
xi, σ
)
= 12`i
∥∥xi − xi∗∥∥2 + (a σ + b)> xi,
for some reference decision variable xi∗ ∈ Rn, parameter
`i > 0, parameters a ∈ R and b ∈ Rn. Since the dependence
of J i on its second argument is affine, the setup satisfies our
Standing Assumption 1, precisely with C = a In.
Numerically, we take the following values: N = 100,
a = 1, b = 0.5, X i = [0.25 , 0.75], xi∗ sampled uniformly
in [0, 1] and `i = 1.5 for all i. For three choices of k, i.e.,
k = 0.2, k = 0.4, or k = 0.6, we plot the time evolution
of the distance of the average strategy from its equilibrium,
‖avg(x(t))− σ¯‖ (Fig. 1) and that of the integral control
signal σ(t) from its equilibrium σ¯ (Fig. 2).
In our numerical experience, the control gain k in (4) can
sensibly speed up the convergence to an equilibrium, but only
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Fig. 1. Distance between the average strategy over time and the average
strategy at the aggregative equilibrium.
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Fig. 2. Distance between the integral control signal over time and the
average strategy at the aggregative equilibrium.
up to a critical value above which oscillations may occur.
Indeed, the inequality in (6) does not hold for large k.
VI. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
In the context of aggregative games, continuous-time
integral dynamics with semi-decentralized computation and
information exchange can ensure global asymptotic conver-
gence to aggregative equilibria, provided that the control gain
is appropriately chosen.
Future research will focus on extending the convergence
analysis to the case of general network games, possibly with
coupling constraints, and with relaxed technical assumptions.
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APPENDIX: PROOFS
Proof of Lemma 1
By convexity and the minimum principle, a collective
vector x¯ = col
(
x¯1, . . . , x¯N
)
is an aggregative equilibrium
exists if and only if
(zi − yi)> ∂J
i
∂yi
(yi, avg(x¯))
∣∣∣∣
yi=x¯i
≥ 0, ∀i ∈ I, ∀zi ∈ X i
In view of (1), the variational inequality above can be
equivalently rewritten as in (2). 
Proof of Lemma 2
Let (x¯, σ¯) be an equilibrium for (3), i.e.
0 = ΠX i
(
x¯i,−∂f i (x¯i)− Cσ¯) , ∀i ∈ I,
0 = −σ¯ + 1N
∑
j∈I x¯
j
or, equivalently,
0 = ΠX i
(
x¯i , −∂f i (x¯i)− Cavg(x¯)) , ∀i ∈ I,
σ¯ = avg(x¯).
If x¯ ∈ int(X ), then ΠX i
(
x¯i , −∂f i(x¯i)− Cavg(x¯)) =
−∂f i(x¯i) − Cavg(x¯), for all i ∈ I, hence the equilibrium
is such that 0 = −∂f i(x¯i) − Cavg(x¯), ∀i ∈ I. This
equation implies that x¯ satisfies the variational inequality
in (2), hence, by Lemma 1, it is an aggregative equilibrium.
If x¯ ∈ bdry(X ), then there exists a nonempty subset of
indices Ibdry ⊆ I such that x¯i ∈ bdry(X i) for all i ∈ Ibdry.
For each i ∈ Ibdry, we necessarily have (see [34]) that
−∂f i(x¯i)− Cavg(x¯) ∈ NX i(x¯i)
and by definition of the normal cone operator NX i , it follows
that, for all i ∈ Ibdry,(
z − x¯i)> (∂f i(x¯i) + Cavg(x¯)) ≥ 0, ∀z ∈ X i.
On the other hand, for each i ∈ I \ Ibdry, we have that
ΠX i
(
x¯i,−∂f i(x¯i)− Cavg(x¯)) = −∂f i(x¯i) − Cavg(x¯),
hence −∂fi∂xi (x¯i) − Cavg(x¯) = 0. We conclude that even
when x¯ ∈ bdry(X ), the variational inequality in (2) holds
and, by Lemma 1, x¯ is an aggregative equilibrium.
Conversely, if x¯ is an aggregative equilibrium, then
−∂f i(x¯i) − Cavg(x¯) ∈ NX i(x¯i) for all i ∈ I. Since
ΠX i(x¯i, v) = projTXi(x¯i)(v) for all v ∈ Rn, we have
that ΠX i
(
x¯i , −∂f i(x¯i)− Cavg(x¯)) = 0. The thesis then
follows by setting σ¯ = avg(x¯). 
Proof of Lemma 3
We adapt the approach in [34] to the considered storage
function V . Since ∂V (x) = x− projX¯ (x), we have that
∂V
∂xi
(x)>ΠX i
(
xi , −∂f i(xi) + ui) =(
xi − [projX¯ (x)]i
)>
ΠX i
(
xi , −∂f i(xi) + ui) =
− (xi − [projX¯ (x)]i)> [∂f i(xi)− ui
−ΠX i
(
xi , −∂f i(xi) + ui) −∂f i(xi) + ui] , (9)
where [projX¯ (x)]i denotes the ith block-component of the
vector projX¯ (x). Now, as a consequence of Moreau’s de-
composition theorem, it holds that
−ΠX i
(
xi , −∂f i(xi) + ui)− ∂f i(xi) + ui
= projNXi (xi)
(−∂f i(xi) + ui.) (10)
and, by definition of NX i and noting that [projX¯ (x)]i ∈ X i,
we have that(
[projX¯ (x)]i − xi
)>[−ΠX i (xi , −∂f i(xi) + ui)− ∂f i(xi) + ui] ≤ 0. (11)
From the latter and (9), it then follows that
∂V
∂xi
(x)>ΠX i
(
xi , −∂f i(xi) + ui)
≤ − (xi − [projX¯ (x)]i)> (∂f i(xi)− ui) . (12)
Now, we note that since X¯ is the set of aggregative
equilibria, projX¯ (x) is an aggregative equilibrium, and by
Lemma 2, the pair (projX¯ (x), avg (projX¯ (x))) is an equi-
librium for the dynamics in (3), hence it satisfies
0 = ΠX¯ (projX¯ (x) , −∂f (projX¯ (x)) + u¯) (13)
where u¯ = −1N ⊗ (C avg (projX¯ (x))). Again by Moreau’s
decomposition theorem, the latter yields
− ∂f i ([projX¯ (x)]i) + u¯i
= projNXi ([projX¯ (x)]i)
(−∂f i([projX¯ (x)]i) + u¯i) , (14)
which, by definition of NX i ([projX¯ (x)]i), implies that(−∂f i([projX¯ (x)]i) + u∗i )> (xi − [projX¯ (x)]i) ≤ 0.
(15)
We conclude that
∂V
∂xi
(x)>ΠX i
(
xi , −∂f i(xi) + ui) =
≤ − (xi − [projX¯ (x)]i)> (∂f i(xi)− ui)
≤ (xi − [projX¯ (x)]i)> (−∂f i(xi) + ui)
+
(
∂f i ([projX¯ (x)]i)− u¯i
)> (
xi − [projX¯ (x)]i
)
, (16)
where the first equality holds by (12), and the second one
holds in view of (15). The thesis then follows by summing
up the inequalities over i ∈ I. 
Proof of Proposition 1
For ease of notation, let us define σ¯ := avg (projX¯ (x)).
We first note that
W˙ (x, σ) =[
∂W
∂x (x, σ)
∂W
∂σ (x, σ)
]> [
ΠX (x , −∂f(x)− 1N ⊗ (Cσ))
k (−σ + avg(x))
]
= − (x− projX¯ (x))> (∂f(x)− ∂f(projX¯ (x)))
− (x− projX¯ (x))>(1N ⊗ (C(σ − σ¯)))
+ (σ − σ¯)> k(−σ + σ¯ + avg(x)− avg(projX¯ (x))), (17)
where we have used Lemma 3 with u = −1N ⊗ (Cσ).
Since the functions {f i}i∈I are twice continuous differ-
entiable and the sets X i’s are convex, we have that
− (x− projX¯ (x))> (∂f(x)− ∂f (projX¯ (x)))
= −∑i∈I(xi − [projX¯ (x)]i)>[
∂2f i(xˆi)
] (
xi − [projX¯ (x)]i
)
, (18)
for some xˆi ∈ X i, i ∈ I. By `-strong convexity of f i on
X i, i.e., ∂2f i(ξ) < `In for all ξ ∈ X i, we derive that
− (x− projX¯ (x))> (∂f(x)− ∂f(projX¯ (x)))
≤ −
∑
i∈I
`
∥∥xi − [projX¯ (x)]i∥∥2 . (19)
Furthermore, we have that
(x− projX¯ (x))> (1N ⊗ (C(σ − σ¯)))
=
∑
i∈I
(
xi − [projX¯ (x)]i
)>
C (σ − σ¯) (20)
and
(σ − σ¯)> k (avg(x)− avg(projX¯ (x)))
= (σ − σ¯)> k 1N
∑
i∈I
xi − [projX¯ (x)]i . (21)
By rearranging the terms in matrix form, we obtain that
W˙ (x, σ) ≤ −
∥∥∥∥[ x− projX¯ (x)σ − avg(projX¯ (x))
]∥∥∥∥2
M
,
with matrix
M :=
` InN − 12
C +
k
N In
...
C + kN In

? k InN
 .
Finally, we apply the Gershgorin theorem to the matrix M .
Namely, the condition in (6) implies that
min{`, k} > 12 maxi∈I
N∑
j 6=i
|ci,j |+ |ci,i + kN |,
which in turn implies that M  0. The proof then follows
with  := λmin(M) > 0. 
Proof of Theorem 1
The dynamics in (4) represent a projected dynamical
system with discontinuous right-hand side [35]. Thus, its
solutions must be intended in a Carathe`odory sense.
By [35, Th. 2.5] and [36, Prop. 2.2], since the mapping
col (x, σ) 7→ col (−∂f(x)− 1N ⊗ (Cσ) , −σ + avg(x)) is
Lipschitz continuous on the closed convex set X , for
any initial condition (x0, σ0) ∈ X × Rn, there exists a
unique Carathe`odory solution to (4), (x(·), σ(·)), such that
(x(0), σ(0)) = (x0, σ0), (x(t), σ(t)) ∈ X × Rn for all
t ∈ [0,+∞), and that is uniformly continuous with respect
to the initial condition.
Let S0 be a compact sublevel set of the Lyapunov function
W that contains the initial condition col (x0, σ0). Then, the
intersection set C := S0∩(X × Rn) is a compact set. Let us
consider the Carathe`odory solution (x(t), σ(t)) issuing from
col (x0, σ0) and evaluate the Lyapunov function W (x, σ)
along such solution. By (7), and by a chain rule for absolutely
continuous functions, for almost every t ≥ 0,
W˙ (x(t), σ(t)) ≤ −λmin(M)W (x(t), σ(t)) ≤ 0.
Thus, W is non-increasing along (x(t), σ(t)), and we con-
clude that C is a forward invariant set. Using a Gronwall–
Bellman inequality, see the final arguments in the proof of
[37, Th. 2], we obtain that
W (x(t), σ(t)) ≤ exp (−λmin(M)t) W (x0, σ0),
and therefore∥∥∥∥[ x(t)− projX¯ (x(t))σ(t)− avg (projX¯ (x(t)))
]∥∥∥∥
≤ exp
(
−λmin(M)2 t
)∥∥∥∥[ x0 − projX¯ (x0)σ0 − avg (projX¯ (x0))
]∥∥∥∥ , (22)
which proves global exponential convergence. 
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